


MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

Sir:

Attachment A represents a number of memoranda indicating White House interest in unauthorized disclosure of classified information during the pertinent period.

Attachment B is a Memorandum for the Record dated in 1971 indicating some rationale as to why a surveillance would be initiated so long after the February article in question.


Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

(DATE)

28 January 1975

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FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
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Approved For Release 2007/09/08 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000300120006-1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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December 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration

SUBJECT:

Disclosures of Classified Information
and Coordination and Clearance of
Official Statements

I am becoming increasingly concerned about the disclosure in public media of classified information bearing upon important aspects of national security, particularly that which tends to jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. Such disclosures present a serious threat to our national interests and I am determined that the practice of releasing such information without proper authorization will be brought to an end.

Executive Order 10501, of December 15, 1953, as amended, established regulations and procedures for safeguarding classified information, while especially sensitive data are protected by special systems of clearances.

I direct that immediate steps be taken within the jurisdiction of each addressee to ensure that existing regulations and procedures

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designed to safeguard classified information be reviewed and strengthened where necessary. These regulations and procedures should assure that only those individuals with a demonstrated "need-to-know" receive classified information and that all recipients are constantly aware of the necessity to protect it from public disclosure. They should provide for an adequate security review of all statements and documents made public on subjects with important security connotations. Further, I wish responsible officials to take firm disciplinary action against individuals under their jurisdiction found responsible for careless or deliberate mishandling of classified information.

The Director of Central Intelligence has the statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Accordingly, I shall look to him to provide guidance in this field, especially through the machinery of the intelligence community. I shall expect him to keep me informed of developments and I wish department and agency heads to cooperate fully with him.

I also reaffirm the following instructions which I issued on September 1, 1970 concerning coordination and clearance of public statements and press releases and the necessity for White House clearance of all official communications having policy implications:

--"Public statements and press releases: Prior to release, all public communications on matters of known or potential Presidential interest must be carefully cleared by the White House (Assistant to the President for National Security) for consistency with Presidential policy and for coordination with the departments and agencies who share overlapping interests and responsibilities. Should there be any uncertainty as to Presidential or interdepartmental interest, it will be resolved in favor of clearance."

--"Official communications: All official communications with policy implications must be cleared by the White House. When in doubt, the rule is that messages will be so cleared. This procedure requires close and confidential staff relationships at all levels between the White House and your department as well as among departments."

Signed
RICHARD NIXON

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

8 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director, U. S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration

SUBJECT: Disclosures of Classified Information
and Coordination and Clearance of
Official Statements

1. In the President's memorandum of December 21, 1970, subject as above, he directs that existing regulations and procedures designed to safeguard classified information be reviewed and strengthened where necessary, and he calls for an adequate security review of all public disclosures with important security connotations. I would hope that these actions have been initiated and that any deficiencies which come to light will be corrected.

2. The President, noting the statutory responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, charged me with providing guidance in this field, especially through the machinery of the intelligence community. I am submitting to members and observers of the United States Intelligence Board proposed guidance to assist the intelligence community in carrying out the intent of the President's directive. This guidance, a copy of which is attached, states, in paragraph 4a, that the responsibility of the intelligence chiefs of affected departments and agencies for assessing risks to intelligence sources and methods involved in deliberate disclosures should be delineated, and suggests ways in which this can be accomplished.

3. May I urge that you use your principal intelligence or security officers to work out appropriate procedures to enable them to assist in an advisory capacity in connection with releases which you or your principal officers may contemplate making and which might have security implications? It is my hope that the proposed guidelines may be made applicable to all affected departments and agencies even though some of them may not be represented on the United States Intelligence Board.

4. It would be most helpful if you could let me have your reaction to these proposals and any additional comments you wish to make, so that I will be able to report to the President in the near future what we are doing to carry out his instructions.



Richard Helms

Attachment:
Guidance Governing Disclosures
of Classified Intelligence

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

USIB-D-9.2/39
Special Limited
Distribution

23 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

In response to your memorandum of December 21, 1970, I wish to report what I have done with respect to providing guidance in the field of protection of classified intelligence information including that bearing on intelligence sources and methods.

I have issued through the United States Intelligence Board detailed guidance governing disclosures in this area. A copy of these guidelines is attached. They have been concurred in by the addressees of your December 21st memorandum. Each of them has instituted a thorough review of existing regulations and procedures within his department or agency to make sure that they meet the criteria required for protecting classified intelligence.

The attached guidance for the intelligence community asks that the chiefs of all components of the community do the following:

- Review existing departmental and agency regulations, including briefing and indoctrination procedures;
- Provide for periodic reindoctrination and continuing education in security practices and procedures;
- Review procedures for authorizing and controlling disclosures and releases. (This section specifies that the responsibility of the intelligence chief for assessing risks to intelligence sources and methods should be delineated and that a review should be provided for when danger to such sources and methods may exist. It goes on to provide for sanitizing in appropriate cases and for procedures to report inadvertent or deliberate disclosures, including assessment of damage and remedial action.)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

-- Take firm disciplinary action where appropriate, and refer to the Department of Justice in cases where violation of criminal statutes may be involved.

I shall ask the intelligence chiefs to make a particular effort to assure that in the event of a proposed, or an unauthorized, release of sensitive and specially-compartmented intelligence, the appropriate member of the community be consulted as to potential damage to sources (e.g., the Director of the National Security Agency in the case of communications intelligence). I shall also ask the intelligence chiefs to report back to me periodically on actions taken to implement the guidance, so that I can monitor these developments on your behalf.

I believe that these actions are responsive to your charge to me. I have stressed my particular area of responsibility, i.e., the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The broader field of reviewing the handling of classified information in general is being looked at by a committee responsive to NSSM 113. The Central Intelligence Agency is represented on this committee.



Richard Helms

Attachment

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Distribution

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

12

23 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT : Guidance Governing Disclosures of
Classified Intelligence

1. In accordance with the discussion in executive session of the United States Intelligence Board on April 22, 1971, I am attaching two copies of the agreed Guidance Governing Disclosures of Classified Intelligence. This has been concurred in by all addressees of the President's memorandum of December 21, 1970.

2. I am also enclosing, for your information, a copy of my report to the President in response to his memorandum. I would call your attention to the penultimate paragraph of this report. Please note that I have told him I will ask you to make particular efforts to assure that in the case of releases of sensitive and specially-compartmented intelligence the appropriate member of the community be consulted as to potential damage; and that I am asking you to report periodically to me on measures taken within your respective agencies and departments to implement these guidelines.



Richard Helms
Chairman

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 11, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN PAISLEY
FROM: DAVID YOUNG
SUBJECT: LEAK DATA ASSESSMENT

Following up on our meeting of August 9, 1971, the following is a preliminary list of the kinds of information we would hope to be able to gather.

- (1) The frequency of leaks as a function of time.
- (2) The frequency of leaks associated with particular writers.
- (3) The gravity of leaks as a function of time.
- (4) The frequency of leaks on particular subjects.
- (5) The relationship between the frequency and gravity of leaks on one hand and the intensity of a particular negotiation, e.g. SALT, Berlin, Paris talks, etc.
- (6) The frequency with which particular bureaucracies are involved.
- (7) A comparison of the frequency and gravity of leaks in this Administration with the frequency and gravity of leaks in previous Administrations.
- (8) The recurrence of particular motives.
- (9) The frequency of the use of Congress as a vehicle to leak.
- (10) The comparison of the number of leaks which occur overseas with those which occur at home.

- (11) An estimate of the number and proportion of leaks which are deliberately planted by the Administration (authorized leaks).
- (12) An estimate of the number and proportion of leaks which are unauthorized but intentional.
- (13) An estimate of the number and proportion of leaks which are unintentional and result from either a) a single source, or b) several sources which are pieced together by the reporter.
- (14) An estimate of the number and proportion of leaks that are pro-Administration policy and those which are anti-Administration policy.
- (15) An estimate of the number and proportion by foreign governments.
- (16) A comparison of the number and proportion of leaks which essentially put out correct information in comparison with those that put out essentially incorrect information.
- (17) A breakdown of the subject areas which seem to have the heaviest concentration of leaks.
- (18) A breakdown of the level of officials leaking as a function of frequency and gravity.
- (19) An assessment of the proportion of leaks which are a product of a conscious disinformation program directed against foreign intelligence agencies.

I would appreciate your comments on this and any other suggestions or ideas you might have on the above.

It is my understanding that you will get a preliminary report to me by Monday.

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
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7 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

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SUBJECT :



1. At 1300 hours on 7 February 1971 the Director of Security held a meeting concerning the subject unauthorized disclosure attended by Mr. Edward Proctor and other DDI personnel and representatives of the Security Office. Mr. Osborn advised that the Director was very disturbed by the subject article and had attended a meeting in the morning at the White House at which the President, Messrs. U. Alexis Johnson and Packard, Admiral Moorer, and General Bennett attended. They too were very concerned about this most serious leak and directed that every effort be made to identify the source.


2. The DCI directed Mr. Osborn to identify those individuals who had access to the information, including those who may have been briefed, and have them interviewed by the Security Officers of their respective departments and agencies. The interviews were to commence the opening of business on 8 February and a report furnished to CIA by close of business 8 February.

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3. Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, was contacted at his home. He was requested to have State



report was requested by close of business 8 February.

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4. [] of DIA was contacted at his home and requested to furnish the same information for the Defense Department.

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[]
Chief, Executive Staff

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

The attached is for your information.
Because of the manner in which we developed this
contact, I am at a loss for a suggestion as to how

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

27 June 1972
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY

6-23-72

OJ - I have not kept a copy

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want this pursued further.

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